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Appellant/Cross-Appellee Charles C. Rehn ("Rehn"), by through his counsel,
respectfully submits this Reply .Brief and Brief of Cross-Appellee.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4103(2)G).

I.

CHRISTENSEN'S ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.

Appellee/Cross-Appellants Steve S. Christensen ("Mr. Christensen"), Steve S.
Christensen, P .C. ("SSC") (collectively, "Christensen"), Henroid Nielsen & Christensen,
Christensen ("HNC"), Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz, PLLC ("CCP"), and Hirschi
Christensen, PLLC's ("HC") (collectively, the "Appellees'') 1 incorrectly state the issues of
Christensen's appeal.
Issue 1: Christensen alleges that Christensen's Lien was connected to the Property.

Christensen's Lien was not connected to the Property. R. 390-2; 678-680; 970-972.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Christensen, the sole possible connection stems from
what Mr. Christensen purports was part of a conversation of approximately 10-15 minutes
and amounting to no more than $30.00 in billable time. R. 392. The purported conversation
occurred years before Christensen acquired the property. R. 390-1. Christensen either
admitted these facts or failed to controvert these facts with any admissible evidence. R.
378-80.

1

It is unclear exactly whether the HNC, CCP, and HC are appealing given the statement in the Appellees' Opening
Brief that Appellees and Cross-Appellants, include Mr. Christensen.

1
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Christensen alleges that Rehn agreed to a consensual lien.

But Christensen

judicially admitted that there was no agreement for a consensual lien. Paragraph 114 of
Rehn's Verified Complaint states that "The Lien was also not authorized by agreement
because there is no signed agreement between SSC and Rehn." R. 18. Christensen's
Answer to Paragraph 114 states: "Defendants admit that there was no signed agreement
authorizing the filing of the lien.... " R. 324. The trial court made a specific finding that
"the Defendants have judicially admitted that there was no contractual right to record a
lien." R. 1957. Christensen even admitted at trial that the Lien he recorded states it was
recorded pursuant to statute and not pursuant to a contractual right to lien. R. 3944 at
~i

202:8-203: 18. Thus, the proper phrasing of Christensen's Issue No. 1 is: "Whether the trial
court correctly granted summary judgment on the first two elements of Rehn' s slander of
title claim where the undisputed evidence showed that Christensen's recorded Lien
contained several false statements, sought more than what was owed, and where
Christensen judicially admitted that the Lien was not authorized by any contract."
Christensen's statement of the standard of review is also inaccurate. When
reviewing a summary judgment ruling, "the mere existence of issues of fact does not
preclude summary judgment. The issues of fact must be material to the applicable rule of
law." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).
Issue: 2: During trial, Christensen argued for a directed verdict because there was

purportedly no evidence that he actually knew the Lien was an "unenforceable false lien."
R. 3944 at 123:17-124:5. Christensen then only argued that there was no evidence of
enforceability. Id. He did not argue about evidence of falsity. Id. Rehn then argued that
2
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under Dillon, Rehn only had to produce evidence that Clu-istensen knew his statements
were false to prove malice, and that there was "lots and lots of evidence to support that
finding." Id. at 124:8-14. Clu-istensen did not argue any fmiher, but instead stated when
asked for his response "I don't have anything finiher on that, your Honor." Id. at 124:1518. On that basis, the trial court denied Christensen's directed verdict motion. Id. 124:19.
Thus, Christensen never disputed that Rehn was only required to prove knowingly false
statetnents by Christensen in order to prove that Christensen acted with malice.
Accordingly, the issue was not preserved and is barred by the invited error doctrine.
Under Utah law, "To preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant 'must enter an objection
on the record that is both timely and specific."' Zavala v. Zavala, 2016 UT App 6, ,I 39
(quoting State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Indeed, it appears that
Christensen's issue is barred by the invited error doctrine:
Under the doctrine of invited error, however, Utah courts 'have declined to
engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by statement or act,
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to
the proceeding.'
State v. Cheek, 2015 UT App 243, iJ 62 (quoting State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,I 14).

Christensen concedes that Rehn produced evidence of falsity at trial, "Admittedly,
Relnl established that Christensen knew of some scrivener's errors in the notice of lien ...."
Christensen's Brief at 14. Mr. Christensen's own testimony at trial proved that he knew of
his errors. See, e.g., R. 3944 at 191:11-192:15; 193:8-194:23; 196:9-197:7. Utah law does
not require evidence that Christensen lmew the lien was false and unenforceable, but rather

3
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that he knew it was untme or spurious. See Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust,
2014 UT 14, iJ 36; R. 3945 at 123:14-124:18.
If Issue 2 had been preserved, the proper phrasing of Christensen's Issue 2 would

be: "Whether the trial court correctly denied Christensen's motion for directed verdict on
~I

the element of malice where ample undisputed evidence showed that Mr. Christensen made
knowingly false statements in the Lien."
Christensen misstates that the standard of review for a directed verdict is merely one

~

1

of correctness. The standard of review is actually far more deferential to the trial court.
When an appellant challenges the denial of a motion for directed verdict
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, 'the applicable standard of
review is highly deferential.' 'A defendant must overcome a substantial
burden on appeal to show that the trial court erred in denying a motion for
directed verdict.'
State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, iJ 32 (first quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, iJ 30;

v

~,,

then quoting Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, iJ 27) (emphasis supplied). Thus, Christensen
bears a substantial burden of overcoming this Court's highly deferential view of the trial
court's ruling.
Issue 3: Christensen's phrasing of Issue 3 regarding the jury's award of attomef s

fees fails to account for Jury Instruction No. 36 that specifically instructed the jury to award
only feeds that were reasonably necessary. R. 3866. Christensen did not object to Jury
Instruction No. 36. c;:;hristensen also did not put on any counter-evidence concerning the
reasonableness of attorney fees. R. 3866-8. Thus, the proper phrasing of Issue 3 is as
follows: "Whether there was any basis in the evidence to support the jury's verdict and
whether the trial court abused its sound discretion in denying Christensen's Motion for a
4
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New Trial when the only evidence produced at trial was that the claimed fees were
reasonably necessary and the jury was specifically charged with evaluating the evidence to
detennine if the claimed fees were reasonably necessary."
Chtistensen's statement of the standard of review for a JNOVand motion for a new
trial omits key limiting language. The Utah Supreme Court has declared that,
Because it is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence, a jury
verdict should not be regarded lightly or overturned without good and
sufficient reason. Accordingly, a district court may grant a JNOV motion
only if there is no basis in the evidence, including reasonable inferences that
could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's detennination.
ASC Utah, Inc. v. WolfMountain Resorts, L. C., 2013 UT 24, iJ 18 (citations and quotations

omitted, emphasis supplied). Concerning a motion for a new trial, the Utah Supreme Court
holds that,
A motion for a new trial invokes the sound discretion of the trial court and
appellate review of its ruling is quite limited. We will reverse a district
court's ruling on a motion for a new trial only when there is no reasonable
basis for the decision.... The district judge who presided over a trial is in a
far better position than an appellate court to determined, for example,
whether the evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict or whether jury
awarded damages under the influence of passion or prejudice.
Id. at iJiJ 21-22 (citations and quotations omitted).
·..,)

II.

REHN'S RESPONSE TO CHRISTENSEN'S RECHARACTERIZATION OF
REHN'S ISSUES ON APPEAL.2
Issue 1: It is undisputed that Christensen asserted the enforceability of the October

24, 1997 EngagementLetter(the "Engagement Letter") as a basis to recover. Christensen's
Answer and Counterclaim explicitly asserted a right to recover "attorney fees and

2

Issue 1 and 2 were preserved through Rehn's Motion for Attorney Fees. R. 3319-84; 3478-3610.

5
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costs ... incmTed in prosecuting its claims and defending itself in this legal action pursuant
to its contract with Rehn." R. 333 (emphasis supplied). Christensen continued to asse11
the enforceability of the Engagement Letter multiple times after the trial court's sununary
judgment rulings. See Christensen's Brief at 4, 7, 45-46. Thus, Rehn properly phrased his
Issue 1 in Rehn's Brief because Christensen asserted a right under the Engagement Letter
to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting Christensen's counterclaim and
defending himself against Rehn' s claims.

Issue 2: Christensen admits that the trial court did not state whether it considered
the fact that Mr. Christensen was Rehn's attorney when Christensen slandered Rehn's title.

See Christensen's Brief at 48 n.30 and R. 3855. Mr. Christensen admitted under oath that
Rehn was still his client when Christensen recorded the Lien, and that Christensen still
owed Rehn a duty of undivided impeccable loyalty and undivided impeccable honesty at
that time. R. 3944 at 168:10-20; 153:13-19. For these reasons, Rehn's Issue 2 is properly
phrased in Rehn' s Brief.

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS.
As stated in Rehn's Brief, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 is directly at issue in this

case. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7 is also at issue in this case. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-12102 & 103 have been raised by Christensen, but these statutes are irrelevant given the
specific language in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7.

6
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IV.

RESPONSE TO CHRISTENSEN'S STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS.
Christensen's Statement of Relevant Facts is extremely misrepresentative of the

actual facts in this matter. One glaring example of this is Christensen's Representation that
the Property was the "marital home" and "the central residence of this family for several
years before ... the divorce." Christensen's Brief at 7, 21, and 33. Rehn's ex-wife filed for
divorce in 1996. R. 3 at

if

11 and 314 at

if

11. Rehn did not even begin living at the

Property until July of 1997, when Rehn rented the Property from Lindell Construction and
Bruce Lindell (collectively, "Lindell"), who signed an affidavit verifying this information.
R. 529-530. 3 Thus, Rehn did not even begin renting the Property until six weeks before
his divorce trial. See R. 532; 548; 715. Perhaps that is why the judge presiding over Mr.
Rehn's divorce explicitly ruled that there was "no real property owned by the parties and
thus no allocation is necessary." R. 5-6; 390-391; 3944, 113:15-114:4, 156:1-158:6,
160:24-161 :7. The only support that Christensen offers for his portrayal of the liened
residence as being the "marital home" is page 2 of Christensen's own affidavit, and that
actually says nothing about the Property being the marital home. R. 715. The liened
property was not the marital home.
Christensen alleges that Rehn had a "pre-divorce goal," but Christensen's only
citation for this naked allegation is a page from Christensen's Opposition to Rehn's
Summary Judgment Motion, which actually says nothing about a "pre-divorce goal" and

3

Christensen did not challenge Mr. Lindell's affidavit R. 679.
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which e~pressly states that Christensen did not dispute Lindell 's Affidavit. R. 529-30; 679.
Lindell' s Affidavit confinns that Lindell did not even offer to sell the Prope1ty to Rehn
until 1999. Consequently, there is no evidence of a "pre-divorce goal," and the only
evidence in the record that is relevant to the issues supports the conclusion that there could
not have been a pre-divorce goal.
Christensen alleges that he had a 15-minute conversation with Rehn regarding the
Property during the divorce; yet, Christensen admitted at trial that he had no documentation
of the alleged conversation. R. 3944 at 162:8-13. Christensen also admitted that he did
not know what time of the day, what day, what month, or even the time of year that the
conversation allegedly occWTed. Id. at 162:1-21. Christensen further admitted he did not
even lmow whether the alleged conversation was in person or over the telephone. Id. at
162: 17-19. Christensen also conceded that he could not remember anything about the
alleged 12-year-old conversation except his undocumented advice about the Property. Id.
at 164:12-19.
Christensen alleges as fact that he possessed a contractual lien. This allegation
contradicts Christensen's deposition testimony, trial testimony, judicial admission, and
Christensen's subsequent confinnation of that judicial admission.

In Christensen's

Deposition and again at trial, Christensen admitted that when he drafted the Lien it was not
based on a contract but rather on Utah's attorney lien statute. R. 3944 at 199:23-200:23.
Christensen also stated in his Answer and Counterclaim that, "Defendants admit that there
was no signed agreement authorizing the filing of the lien but deny any other allegations
of fact in this paragraph." R. 324. Christensen later attempted to withdraw this judicial
8
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admission by seeking to amend the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim. R. 1661-4.
Rehn vigorously opposed Clu·istensen's Motion to Amend, R. 1669-86, and Clu·istensen
withdrew his motion to amend. R. 1949-51. By withdrawing his Motion to Amend,
Christensen confirmed his p1ior judicial admission by stating: "Counsel has reviewed the
matter and has determined that an amendment is not needed." R. 1949.
Christensen alleges that he formed SSC ''immediately after" HNC dissolved in June
of 1998. At trial, Mr. Christensen was forced to confirm his prior deposition testimony
that he did not form SSC until at least March of 1999. R. 3944 at 196:9-197 :7. Christensen
was also forced to admit that he drafted the purported "assignment" ofRehn's account from
HNC to SSC only after Mr. Rehn filed this action. Id. at 197:13-23. The purported
assignment does not include any language that would render the effective date of the
assignment to be prior to the filing of Mr. Rehn's action. Id. at 198:10-20 and R. 1068.
Thus, Rehn established at trial that any attempt at assignment from HNC to Mr. Christensen
or SSC did not occur until after this lawsuit began, i.e., approximately 12 years after
Christensen recorded the Lien against Rehn. This directly contradicts what Christensen
stated in the Lien, which was that Rehn hired SSC on September 29, 1995. R. 1063.
Christensen states that by June 30, 2001, Rehn owed Christensen $26,000 related to
the divorce. The Lien stated Rehn owed Christensen $26,807.14 for work associated with
Rehn's divorce. R. 1063. However, Christensen's own prior bills to Rehn stated that Rehn
only owed Christensen $6,198.19 ·in relation to the trial court divorce action as of the date
the Lien was recorded. R. 393. Christensen's own records also demonstrated that some of
the legal fees owed were for legal work unrelated to Rehn' s divorce. Id. and 98 7.
9
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Christensen even admitted at tdal that the Lien contained amounts unrelated to Rehn's
divorce. R. 3944 at 193:8-194:7. Because Christensen's own records show that the amount
stated on the Lien included non-divorce work, Christensen knew that the amount of the
Lien and its cmmection to Rehn's divorce was false.
Christensen characterizes the falsehoods in the Lien as mere "mistakes" or
"scrivener's errors." But the volume and severity of the false statements, combined with
the manner in which the falsehoods work together to falsely portray the Lien, constitute

'1iv

strong circumstantial evidence of intentional deceit. The title "Amended Notice of Lien"
is false because there was no prior lien. R. 3944 at 184:1-16. Christensen's attempt to
portray that falsehood at trial as a "template error" was a recent invention, because·
Christensen did not provide that explanation at his deposition. R. 3944 at 187 :3-189: 17.
Christensen's recitation in the Lien that it was authorized pursuant to "Section 78-

51-41, of the Utah Code Ann., 1953" was designed to further bolster the appearance that
the Lien was an "amended lien." R. 1063. The quoted statute had been repealed by the
~i

time Christensen recorded the Lien. R. 389. Christensen admitted as much at trial. R. 3944
at 194:18-195:17. If Christensen had cited to the correct Attorney's Lien Statute in the
Lien, it would have belied his attempt to make the Lien appear to relate back in time.
Christensen stated in the Lien that the Property was awarded to Rehn in the 1996-

1997 divorce action. R. 1063. Rehn did not even acquire the Property until 2000, i.e.,
several years after the divorce action, and the divorce court declared in 1997 that no
property was awarded in the divorce. R. 390. Christensen admitted at trial that this
statement in the Lien was false. R. 3944 at 190:16-191 :24. As Rehn's divorce attorney, no
10
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one would know better than Christensen that Rehn was not awarded any real property in
the divorce.

Id. at 192:10-18. The only plausible explanation is that Christensen

intentionally misrepresented this pruiicular fact to make the "Amended Lien" appear at
least facially to be authorized by the Attorney's Lien Statute.
Christensen stated in the Lien that Rehn hired SSC to commence work on Rehn's
divorce on September 29, 1995. R. 1063. But Rehn is not the one who filed for divorce,
and his ex-wife trigged the representation when she filed for divorce in 1996. R. 392. SSC
did not exist until March of 1999, a fact that Christensen obviously knew as the creator of
SSC. R. 392-393; 3944 at 196:9-197:7. The only explanation for these falsifications was
to make SSC's lien rights facially appear to relate back to 1995.
Christensen asserts that Rehn admitted to hiring Christensen in 1995. But what
Rehn actually testified was that Rehn met Christensen in 1995 in "a get-together meeting"
and that Rehn did not actually hire Christensen until 1996 when Mr. Rehn was served with
divorce papers. R. 3945 at 19:21-20:7. Rehn never said he hired SSC or Mr. Christensen
on September 29, 1995 as stated in the Lien. Id. and R. 1063.
Christensen implies that he sent Rehn notice of the Lien in August of 2001.
Christensen does so because UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7(7) requires an attorney to give
notice of an attorney's lien to the client within 30 days of recording the lien. Christensen
recorded the Lien on July 25, 2001. R. 1063. But Christensen has judicially admitted that
September 26, 2001 was the first notice of the Lien he sent to Rehn:

REQUEST NO. 7: Please admit that Defendants failed to send any notice
of the Lien to Rehn prior to September 26, 2001.

11
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RESPONSE: Admit.

R. 977; See also R. 684. Clu-istensen likewise admitted at trial that the first time that
Cln·istensen infonned Rehn of the Lien was September 26, 2001. R. 3944 at 113: 15114: 18; 261: 15-262:3. Clu·istensen admitted at trial that he did not send any notice to Rehn
until Christensen learned that Rehn was going to refinance the mortgage on his home in
September of 2001. R. 3944 at 173:8-175:18, 177:4-13. The fact that Christensen tried to
record the Lien without giving notice, and then belatedly tried to cover himself when he

~

learned that Rehn would likely discover the Lien on his own is yet more uncontroverted
evidence of intentional deceit by Christensen.
Christensen contends that in January of 2002, Rehn agreed to pay $125 per month
beginning in January 2002 and that Christensen would not charge interest under that
payment plan. Christensen's own records prove that agreement never existed. The evidence
showed that Christensen offered an arrangement in a letter to Rehn dated January 15, 2002
that requested Rehn's signature.

R. 988-9.

But Rehn did not sign that letter. Id.

Christensen then sent a follow-up letter, dated February 13, 2002, in which Christensen
stated:
I have not included incurring interest on the enclosed bills with anticipation
of reaching an agreement with you. You indicated that you would be
preparing an agreement in response to the letter I sent you a couple of weeks
ago.
R. 989.

This statement by Christensen necessarily constitutes an admission that no

agreement was in effect. (Christensen's spreadsheets show that Christensen charged Rehn
interest in January 2002, February 2002, March 2002, and April 2002. R. 990-1) Put
12
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simply, Christensen's own.letters and spreadsheets disprove Christensen's naked allegation
that he had entered into a repayment agreement with Reim.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.

I.

Christensen's own pleadings and admissions refute Christensen's arguments

and demonstrate the Rehn is entitled to an award of attorney fees under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-5-826 (the "Reciprocal Statute") as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in

Hooban v. Unicity lntn'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40. Under Hooban any party may trigger the

Reciprocal Statute by asserting the enforceability of a writing as a basis for recovery.
Christensen triggeredHooban and the Reciprocal Statute when he invoked the Engagement
Letter as a basis for recovering attorney's fees, including attorney fees incurred defending
against Rehn's Slander of title Claim. Christensen has admitted in his Brief that he
attempted to invoke the Engagement Letter to defeat Rehn' s slander of title claim. The
Engagement Letter did have an attorney's fee provision, and if Christensen had succeeded
in defeating Rehn's Slander of Title claim because of the Engagement Letter, Christensen
would have been entitled to recover attorney's fees from Rehn. By putting Rehn at risk of
paying attorney fees if Christensen's Engagement Letter defense prevailed, Christensen
triggered reciprocal attorney fee liability under § 78B-5-826. Thus, the trial court erred by
not awarding Rehn attorney fees pursuant to that statute.
II.

The trial court erred by deeming Christensen's conduct to be "standard"

slander of title conduct. Rehn was Christensen's client, and Christensen owed Rehn
fiduciary duties of undivided loyalty and impeccable honesty. Despite swearing an oath to
honor those duties, Christensen intentionally crafted a fraudulent lien and then recorded
13
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that li~n without even hinting to Rehn what Ch1istensen was doing. Then when Christensen
learned that he was about to get caught, he lied to Rehn about the purpose of the lien. When
Rehn asked Christensen to remove the lien, Christensen refused and ultimately demanded
nearly $90,000 to remove a $26,000 lien. It turns out that this is a modus operandi for
Christensen, as evidence by CFD Payson, LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, Dahl v.

Dahl, 2015 UT 23; and Dahl v. Christensen, 2009 UT App 280. Because of these facts,
which Christensen concedes the trial court failed to consider, it was error for the trial court
to charactedze this case as a run-of-the-mill slander of title case that was not worthy of an
equitable award of attorney fees.
III(a). Summary Judgment against Christensen was proper because sufficient
evidence established that: (a) Christensen recorded a false lien; {b) Christensen knew about
the falsities in the Lien when he recorded it; and (c) the Lien jeopardized Rehn's sale of
his Property.
IIl{b). Christensen's characterization of the Property as the "marital home" is
simply untenable. Rehn didn't even begin living in the Property as a rental tenant until after
his wife filed for divorce and he was weeks away from his divorce trial. Christensen's
relianceuponBayHarbor Farm, LCv. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133 is misplaced for several

reasons including the fact that in Sumsion, the property was actually owned by the client
when the legal work was performed. The present case is much more similar to the facts
of CFD Payson, LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, wherein Christensen recorded an
unlawful attorney's lien for a shocking $1. 6 Million in purported attorney's fees against a
property that his former divorce client did not own or receive from a divorce decree.
14
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CL:

Christensen's fraudulent Lien is not the result of a few mere "hi-egularities," but rather the
product of a premeditated design to create an illusory right to a lien where no actual right
existed.
III(c). Christensen did not possess a consensual lien because Christensenjudicially
admitted that there was no contractual right to a lien. The Lien itself states that it is recorded
pursuant to statute, and not pursuant to agreement.
III( d). Any error at sunimary judgment was harmless because Christensen has
conceded that at trial Rehn established the existence of false statements in the Lien and that
Christensen knew of these false statements when he recorded the Lien. Thus, even if
summary judgment had not established the first two elements of a slander of title claim,
those elements were clearly established at trial.
IV. Rehn established Christensen's malice at trial by proving that Christensen knew
that the Lien was false and that Christensen dissembled to Rehn about the Lien's purpose.
V. Christensen failed to present any evidence at trial that Rehn's attorney fees were
unreasonable. Christensen also did not object to the jury instruction that specifically
charged the jury with determining whether Rehn' s attorney fees were reasonably
necessary. The jury had before it the entire catalog of billing entries from Rehn' s attorneys,
and the jury determined that the fees that Rehn incurred were reasonably necessary. Thus,
there is a sound evidentiary basis for the jury's award of attorney's fees, and no basis
whatsoever to overturn that award.

15
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ARGUMENTS

I.

REHN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
HOOBAN AND UTAH'S RECIPROCAL ATTORNEY FEE STATUTE.

Clnistensen argues that Rehn is not entitled to an award of attorney fees because
neither party asserted a contract as the basis of recovery. Christensen's argument is refuted

G,ti

by Christensen's own pleadings and admissions.
As a threshold matter, Christensen's quotation of the Reciprocal Statute adds nonexistent language and omits other important language. In full, the Reciprocal Statute states:
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a
civil action based upon any promissory note, wlitten contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney fees.
UTAH CODE ANN.§

78B-5-826. Christensen inserts the word "only" in his quotation and

omits the terms "promissory note," and "or other writing" to make it appear that fees may
only be awarded when a mutually endorsed written contract so provides. The plain
language of the Reciprocal Statute actually allows attorney fees to be awarded to a
prevailing party when any "writing" allows at least one party to recover. There is no other
limiting language.
Christensen also ignores the fact that he is the one who asserted the enforceability
of the Engagement Letter as a basis for recovery. The Utah Supreme Court defined what
the phrase "based upon" in the Reciprocal Statute means when the Court held that, "an
action is 'based upon' a contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation asserts the
writing's enforceability as a basis for recovery."' Hooban v. Unicity Intn '/, Inc., 2012 UT
16
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40, ~ 22. Under Hooban, when any pa1ty invokes the enforceability of a contract as a basis
for recovery in either a defense or a prosecution of a claim, and also invokes an attorney's
fees provision as a basis for fees as the prevailing paiiy, then Utah's Reciprocal Statute is
triggered.
Here, Christensen first triggered the Reciprocal Statute and Hooban when
Christensen invoked the Engagement Letter's enforceability in his Answer and
Counterclaim by stating:
65.
SSC is entitled to receive $26,807.14 plus contractual interest at the
rate of 18% per annum from June 30, 2001.
66.
SSC is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs from the proceeds of
the sale of the Sadclleback Property that it incurred in prosecuting its claims
and defending itself in this legal action pursuant to its contract with Rehn.
R. 333 (emphasis supplied). By invoking the Engagement letter as his basis to recover: (a)
18% interest; (b) attorney fees and costs for prosecuting his counterclaim; and (c) attorney
fees and costs incurred in defending himself against Rehn' s claims, Christensen triggered
the Reciprocal Statute and Hooban. Christensen's Brief concedes that he "asserted the
existence of a contract in multiple instances and at multiple states of the litigation. Indeed,
Appellees sought to enforce the contract through their counterclaim ...." Christensen's
Brief at 45 (emphasis supplied). Christensen's Brief also concedes, "Later, Appellees
asserted the contract's existence to prove a lack of the malice requisite for a slander of title
claim."

Id. at 46.

These admissions by Christensen establish that Christensen's

counterclaim was "based upon" the alleged enforceability of the Engagement Letter, and
the Engagement Letter was used throughout the case as a defense. Christensen continued
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to assert the Engagement Letter as a basis to avoid liability for slandering his client Rehn 's
title. If Christensen had prevailed in that argument, Rehn would have been subject to an
atton1ey fee award in Christensen's favor.
Clu-istensen next argues that Rehn is not entitled to attorney fees because he failed
to allocate those fees among Rehn' s causes of action. Christensen, however, ignores his
own broadly stated invocation of the Engagement Letter's enforceability, which stated:
SSC is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs from the proceeds of the
sale of the Saddleback Property that it incurred in prosecuting its claims and
defending itself in this legal action pursuant to its contract with Rehn.
R. 333 (emphasis supplied). Christensen did not limit his alleged right to recover attorney
fees to one or more specific claims that Rehn asserted. To the contrary, Christensen
asserted a broad right to recover all of his attorney fees and costs in defending against
Rehn' s "legal action" as a whole. By making such a broad invocation of a right to fees,
Christensen subjected himself to a similarly broad award of fees. Nonetheless, Rehn
allocated his fees at the trial court level as part of Rehn' s Memorandum seeking an award
of attorney fees. R. 3408-9.
Under Christensen's broad invocation, Christensen would have been entitled to all
of his attorney fees incurred in defending himself had Christensen prevailed. Christensen
thus put Rehn at risk of being forced to pay attorney fees and costs on any claim upon
which Rehn did not prevail. It is therefore only fitting that Christensen be held to the same
standard. To find otherwise would create an unequal playing field.
Christensen also argues that Rehn is not entitled to any award of additional attorney
fees because any entitlement to attorney fees is limited to contractual matters. But
18
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Christensen invoked the Engagement Letter as his contractual defense to Rehn' s slander of
title claim, and if Christensen would have prevailed in that contractual defense. Rehn would
then have been subject to an attorney fee assessment as the non-prevailing patty. The fact
that Rehn included all fees related to claims to which Clu·istensen invoked a contractual
defense does not invalidate Rehn' s fee request.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER
CHRISTENSEN'S BETRAYAL OF ms CLIENT AND ms PROFESSION.

A.

Christensen Knowingly Violated His Acknowledged Duties of
Impeccable Honesty and Undivided Loyalty to Rehn.

The trial court had the discretion to award attorney fees under its equitable powers.
The trial court erred in failing to consider Christensen's betrayal of a client, and
Christensen's betrayal of the legal profession as an aggravating factor in assessing
Christensen's conduct. At trial, Mr. Christensen admitted when he recorded the Lien, Rehn
was still Christensen's client and that Christensen owed Rehn a duty of undivided
impeccable loyalty and undivided impeccable honesty. R. 3944 at 168:10-20; 153:13-19.
Thus, Christensen knew that he had fiduciary duties of undivided loyalty and impeccable
honesty to Rehn, and he nonetheless set out to falsify a lien and encumber Rehn's property
under the most deceitful of circumstances.

B.

Christensen Intentionallv Violated the Attorney Lien Statute, Refused
to Release the Falsified Lien and Forced the Present Action.

After recording the slanderous lien, Christensen did not inform Rehn of the Lien
even when the two met face to face. It was only after Christensen realized that his Lien
might be discovered during Rehn' s refinance of his mortgage that Christensen was forced
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to disclose the Lien. Christensen's initial withholding of the notice violated the Attorney's
Lien Statute. R. 977; R. 3944 at 261 :25-262:3; and UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7(7). When
Cln·istensen finally did disclose the Lien to Rehn, Christensen dissembled and said it was
to help Rehn refinance the Property, and that Cluistensen would remove the lien if it was
t,;.,,

~

not helpful to Rehn. R. 395; 3944 at 179:3-15; 182:4-22. Then when Rehn finally did ask
Christensen to remove the Lien, Christensen refused to remove it unless Rehn paid
Christensen over $43,000.

Id. at 181:9-17; 205:12-206:7. Christensen then began

~

demanding even more money. Id. at 181:18-19. Christensen's final demand was for nearly
$90,000. R. 551. Christensen's conduct is akin to extortion, and Christensen appears to
have a particular penchant for inflating his demands for past due fees when his clients
attempt to defend themselves from his unethical fee demands. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT
23, if1175-211; CFD Payson, LLCv. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, 1if 3, 11-13.
C.

Christensen Used Contradictory Positions and Baseless Motions During
Litigation in an Attempt to Exhaust Rehn.

During litigation, Christensen took varying and contradictory positions, which

~:

required Rehn to incur heavy attorney fees to pin Christensen to any one position. R. 3345
at 87:10-89:17. Christensen also filed baseless motions in an effort to exhaust Rehn. For
example, Christensen judicially admitted in his Answer and Counterclaim that,
"Defendants admit that there was no signed agreement authorizing the filing of the lien but
deny any other allegations of fact in this paragraph." R. 324. Christensen later attempted
to recast this judicial admission with a motion to amend the Defendants' Answer and
Counterclaim. R. 1661-4. Rehn was then forced to show the inherent and fatal flaws
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Christensen's Motion to Amend. R. 1669-86. In response, Christensen withdrew his
motion to amend. R. 1949-51. Christensen then brought the same motion to amend on the
eve of trial, and after representing to the trial curt that Christensen was ready for trial. R.
3943 at 3:14-4:4; 27:6-23. Because of these facts, Rehn was forced to file a motion to
strike Christensen's renewed motion to amend, which the trial court granted. Id.
Also on the eve of tiial and after representing to the trial court that he was ready for
trial, Christensen brought a second motion for summary judgment. R. 3943 at 3:14-4:1.
This motion also required Rehn to stop trial preparations to file a motion to strike based
upon the untimeliness ·of the Christensen's Motion and the fact that Christensen's Motion
sought to relitigate previously decided issues, which the trial court partially granted. Id. at
29:3-25. On the issues that the trial court did not strike, damages and laches, the trial court
subsequently denied Christensen's second motion for summary judgment. R. 3034. Put
simply, Christensen filed meritless and redundant motions as the parties were in the midst
of preparing for a jury trial as part of an aggressive litigation strategy to try to exhaust Rehn
prior to trial.

D.

Christensen Has Wrongfully Used Attorney Liens in Attempts to Extort
Exorbitant Fees from Former Divorce Clients like Rehn.

This is not the first time that Mr. Christensen has wrongfully attempted to use an
attorney lien to extract exorbitant amounts from his clients. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT
23, 11 205-206 (attempt by Christensen to obtain $2.1 Million through an attorney's lien
defeated due to_ Christensen's violation of ethical rules and attorney lien statute); CFD
Payson, LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, 1,r 3, 11-13 (attempt by Christensen to
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obtain $1.6 Million through an attorney's lien defeated due to fact that liened real property
was not owned by the lienee nor distributed in the divorce decree); Dahl v. Christensen,
2009 UT App 280 (where Christensen's attorney lien against a client found to be a
wrongful lien); Christensen v. Black (In re Black), Nos. UT-02-065, UT-02-066, 2003
Bankr. LEXIS 191, 4-5 (U.S. B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 14, 2003) ($7,101 in sanctions awarded
against Christensen for using his attorney lien to violate automatic bankruptcy stay of a
former divorce client). This record of pathological abuse of attorney's lien power by
Christensen proves that Christensen is a predator of his own clients, and it was error for
the trial court to characterize Christensen's predation of Rehn as standard slander of title
conduct.

E.

The Trial Court Erroneously Failed to Consider the Above Facts.

When the trial court declined to award equitable attorney fees, the trial court did not
consider any of the above facts and circumstances. R. 3855. Christensen even concedes
that the trial court failed to state whether it understood that Christensen was Rehn's
attorney. See Christensen's Brief at 48. The trial court characterized Christensen's conduct
as a run-of-the-mill slander of title case, without any reference to the attorney/client
relationship that existed when Christensen first slandered Rehn' s title. Id. But, in a normal
slander of title case, the tortfeasor is not subject to duties of impeccable honesty or
undivided loyalty to the person he is preying upon. Because the trial court apparently failed
to take into consideration the heinous nature of Christens' acts, and Christensen's attempt
to exhaust Rehn in litigation, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny Mr.
Rehn's request for an equitable award of attorney fees. This Court should reverse the trial
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comis' decision and order that equitable attorneys' fees be awarded in an amount to be
determined by the trial cou11.

F.
Christensen's Arguments Regarding Attornev's Fees Are Unsupported
and Meritless.
Cluistensen argues that under the "American Rule," attorney fees are "per se not
recoverable as damages," and he relies upon Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6. But Ne.ff actually
refutes Christensen's position and favors Rehn's position. The Utah Supreme Cow1
expressly stated in Neff.
[B]ecause our cases acknowledge the possibility that att0111ey fees can form
the basis of damages in a slander of title claim, so long as those fees are
reasonably necessary to remove disparaging clouds from the slandered title.
This is an exception to our general rule for awarding attorney fees in
tort cases.
Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 45 (emphasis supplied). Thus, attorney fees on slander of title

claims are a recognized exception to the American Rule, and thus are not per se
unrecoverable as damages.
Christensen also contends that equity must follow the law when there is a conflict
between law and equity, and Christensen invokes Stroud v. Stroud for support. 738 P.2d
649 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, that principle is not applicable here, and Stroud is
readily distinguishable from this case. The first difference is that Stroud concerns a divorce
where the parties disputed the amount of interest on unpaid child support. See id. at 649.
Specifically, the relevant statute allowed the trial court to increase, but not lower or
eliminate, the rate of interest on child support payments for equitable reasons, but the
defendant sought to have the court stay the accrual of interest altogether for equitable

23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reasons. Id. at 650. In that instance, the equitable principles directly contradicted express
statutory law. See id. at 650-1. Here, there is no such contradiction. Even Clu·istensen
aclmowledges that the law allows a trial comt to grant attorney fees on equitable grounds.
Thus, the piinciples of equity are not in conflict with the law, and nothing prevented the
trial court from awarding equitable attorney fees.
Clnistensen argues that he was entitled to something for his previous representation
of Rehn. This flies in the face of Rehn's discharge of Christensen's debt in bankruptcy.

~

Once Mr. Rehn' s debt to Christensen was discharged in bankruptcy, Rehn' s legal debt was
extinguished.

III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST CHRISTENSEN WAS PROPER AND
SUPPORTED BY UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE.
Christensen argues that the trial court shc~mld not have established the first two

elements of slander of title (I) publication of slanderous statement disparaging title, and 2)
statement was false) because Christensen had an attorney's lien and a consensual lien.
Christensen is wrong on each of his arguments.

A.

Christensen's Recording of a False Lien makes a Right to Lien
Irrelevant.

Whether Christensen possessed an attorney's lien or a consensual lien is irrelevant
because it does not change the fact that the first two elements of a slander of title were
established by hard evidence.

Specifically, the hard evidence established that

~

1

Christensen's Lien contained numerous false statements. R. 389-93. Christensen admitted
that the Lien contained false statements and that Christensen knew these statements were
false. Christensen's Brief at 14. A glaring example of this is that Christensen falsely stated
24
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in the Lien that the Property was "awarded to" Relm "in the Divorce Decree." R. 1063.
As Rehn's divorce attorney, Christensen, more than anyone, else knew that the Divorce
Decree specifically stated that no real property was involved. R. 538. Thus, whether or
not there was a 1ight to lien is irrelevant because the Lien falsely states that Reim received
the Property in the divorce, and Christensen knew that to be false. This is just one of the
numerous false statements in the Lien. The undisputed evidence also clearly established
that Cluistensen's Lien was impeding and jeopardizing a pending sale ofRehn's Property.

R. 634-636. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Christensen had a valid right to a lien
because Christensen knew that the Lien he recorded contained false statements, and
because that Lien was disparaging Rehn's title.

B.

Christensen Did Not have a Valid Attorney's Lien.

i.

The Property was not "Owned" by Rehn during the Divorce.

Christensen had no right to record an attorneys' lien against the Property. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 38-2-7 limits the property that attorneys may lien to "property owned by the

client that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client." See UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 38-2-7 (emphasis supplied).

In this case, the Property was not "owned" by Mr. Rehn at any time during his
divorce, nor was the Property the subject of, or connected with, Rehn's divorce, the
subsequent appeal, or his dispute with Hertz. The divorce court specifically found that,
because neither Rehn nor his wife owned any real property, no real property was at issue
in the· divorce. R. 53 8. The undisputed facts also established that Rehn did not have a
contractually protected future interest in the Property at the time of his divorce. The
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previous owner of the Property confirmed that Rehn did not even rent the Prope11y until
1997, and that Rehn never even discussed the sale of the Prope11yuntil over two years after
Rehn's divorce trial. R. 529-530. The deed between Rehn and Lindell also proves that
Rehn did not actually acquire the Prope1ty until February of 2000, which was long after
any representation terminated with respect to the divorce action and the subsequent appeal.
R. 526-527. This hard evidence shows that Property was neither the subject of, nor
connected with, the divorce, appeal, or Hertz representations.

Because there is no

~

connection between the Property and the attorney's fees referenced in the Lien, the
Attorney's Lien Statute did not bestow a right upon Christensen to lien the Property.
cL.1

ii.

The Property was Not Connected
Representation of Rehn in the Divorce.

with

Christensen's

Christensen argues that the Property was "connected with" Rehn's divorce by way
of a purported 15-minute conversation between Christensen and Rehn in which Christensen
purportedly told Rehn not to purchase any property until after the divorce. This selfserving statement by Christensen is not only insufficient on its face to create a connection,
it is just not plausible.

At trial, Christensen admitted that: (a) Christensen had no

documentation of the alleged conversation (R. 3944 at 162:8-13); (b) Christensen did not

~

know what time, day, month, or even the season of year that the conversation allegedly
occurred (id. at 162:1-21); and (c) Christensen did not know whether the alleged
conversation was in person or over the telephone (id. at 162:17-19). Christensen also
admitted under oath that the "legal fee value" of a pmported 15-minute conversation
between Rehn and Christensen regarding future property was approximately $30.00 R.
26
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513. Rehn paid Christensen far more than this $30.00 before the lien was ever filed. R.
3941 at 85:3-24.

Thus, even if the conversation occun-ed, the trial comi correctly

concluded that other than the 15-minute conversation, the Prope1iy was not connected with
the divorce in any way, and that Reim had already paid Chtistensen in full for legal time
the purported conversation took, and that Christensen was not entitled to lien the property
for more than $26,000. Id. at 77:2-78:8.
But, even if Christensen had advised Rehn during divorce litigation about acquiring
future property that 'off the cuff advice does not open the door to allowing an attorney to
record liens for omnibus attorney fees against all future properties acquired by a client.
Otherwise, the confining language of the Attorney's Lien Statute would essentially be
meaningless.

iii.

The Property was Not the Marital Home.

Christensen argues that the Property was the marital home in Rehn's divorce.
Christensen never made this argument to the trial court. In Utah, appellate courts do not
consider issues first raised on appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. See,
e.g., State v. Tingey, 2014 UT App 228, ,r 3.
Rehn's ex-wife filed for divorce in 1996. R. 3 at iJ 11 and 314 at if 11. Rehn did
not begin living at the Property as a renter until July of 1997. R. 529-530, 679. Three
weeks after Rehn began renting the Property, the divorce trial took place. R. 1063. The
divorce court expressly stated that there was "no real property owned by the parties and
thus no allocation is necessary." R. 5-6; 390-391; 3944, 113:15-114:4, 156:1-158:6,
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160:24-161:7 Put simply, the Prope1ty is where Rehn went to live after he moved out of
the marital home.
iv.

Christensen's Case Law is Inapplicable.

Christensen relies heavily upon this Comt's opinion in Bay Harbor Farm, LC v.
Sumsion, but Christensen's reliance is misplaced. 2014 UT App 133. Procedurally,

Christensen did not cite Bay Harbor Farm until Christensen moved to reconsider the
Court's prior summary judgment ruling by way of a second summary judgment motion.

b

R. 675-711; 1995; 3943 at 29:3-25. Because Christensen only raised Bay Harbor Farm in
a motion to reconsider, this Court reviews the trial court's decision regarding that case for
an abuse of discretion. See Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, iJ 22.
The sole issue in Bay Harbor was the interpretation of Utah's Wrongful Lien Act.
See Bay Harbor, 2014 UT App 133 at 16. In that case, this Court evaluated the use of a

"good faith'' defense in the context of the summary proceeding provided for by Utah's
Wrongful Lien Act. See id. at iJ 12. In the present case, whether the Defendants' Lien was

C:.:_,:

wrongful under the Utah's Wrongful Lien Act is not an issue being appealed, and the order
being appealed from is not from a summary proceeding under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act.
Moreover, the attorney in Bay Harbor Farms liened property that was owned by the
attorney's client during the representation at issue and that was directly related to the legal
service being provided. See id. at 1il 1-2. Mr. Rehn never owned the Property during any
phase of Christensen's divorce representation. The trial court correctly recognized that
Bay Harbor Farm does not extend as far as Christensen suggests. R. 3943 at 29:3-25.
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A case with much more similar facts to the present case is CFD Payson, LLC v.

Christensen, which ironically involved Mr. Christensen as the Defendant. 2015 UT App
251. In CFD Payson, Mr. Clu-istensen recorded an attorney's lien for $1.6 Million against
a parcel in which Christensen claimed that his fonner divorce client, Ms. Dahl, held an
interest. See id. at 1 3. When CFD Payson demanded that Mr. Christensen remove his
lien, Cluistensen refused. Id. at 1 4. CFD Payson then filed a lawsuit for slander of title
and declaratory judgment. Id. at

1 5.

Mr. Christensen argued that his lien was proper

because Ms. Dahl became an owner of the land by virtue of the divorce decree. Id. Mr.
Christensen succeeded in convincing the trial court that he was c01Tect. Id. at 1 6. This
Court, however, reversed the dismissal after concluding that Ms. Dahl was not personally
awarded title to the subject land in the Divorce Decree. See id. at 119, 12-13. This Court
reasoned that,
For a marital asset to be distributed, the asset must be in the legal possession
of one or both of the marital parties. Thus, assets in the rightful possession
of a separate entity generally are not available for distribution.

Id. at 110. As in Payson, Christensen attempted to lien a former divorce client's property
when that property was not distributed to the client in the divorce. Given that the facts here
present an even clearer case that the Property was not subject to an attorney's lien, this
Court should once again conclude that Mr. Christensen had no right to lien a property that
his former divorce client did not own, and that Christensen did not have a valid statutory
attorney's lien.
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v.

Christensen's Violations of the Attorney Lien Statute Invalidated
his Lien.

Christensen's Lien on the Prope1ty is invalid because Cln·istensen violated the
procedural requirements of the Attorney's Lien Statute. Attomey's liens, like mechanic's
liens, are creatures of statute, and a lien claimant cannot acquire a lien "unless the claimant
has complied with the statutory provisions creating the lien." Utah Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 366
P.2d 598,600 (Utah 1961), see also Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449,452 (Utah 1989). "A
lien cannot be acquired unless the claimant complies with the statutory provisions." First
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 921-22 (Utah 1981), see also In re Brussow, 2012

UT 53,

,r 27

n.23 (emphasizing the importance of complying with the Attorney Lien

~

Statute). This compliance requirement is strictly enforced. See id.
With regard to lien verification, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that,
~-

''Verification is not a hypertechnicality that we can discount. Without verification, no lien
is created." First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981). Utah's
Attorney's Lien Statute required Christensen to include a verification on the Lien that the
attorney issued a demand for payment, and that the demand was not paid within 30 days of
the demand. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 38-2-7(5)(c). The Lien contains no such verification.
R. 1063. Instead, the Lien states that Christensen only became entitled to the liened amount

on June 30, 2001, i.e., 25 days before Christensen recorded the Lien. Because Christensen
~I

failed to satisfy the verification requirement of the Attorney's Lien Statute, Christensen did
not have a valid attorney's lien.
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The Attorney's Lien Statute also requires that, "Within 30 days after filing the notice
of lien, the attorney shall deliver or mail by ce1iified mail to the client a copy of the notice
of lien." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7(6) (emphasis supplied). Christensen recorded the
Lien on July 25, 2001, and he admitted that he did not send notice to Rehn until 60 days
later. R. 1063 and 977. Christensen also admitted that he did not send any notice by
certified mail. R. 978. Christensen's admissions establish that Christensen violated the
notice provisions of the Attorney's Lien Statute and the Lien was rendered void by the lack
of proper notice.
vi.

Compliance with the Attorney's Lien Statute was Critical.

Christensen argues that it was not necessary to comply with the notice requirements
because the Attorney's Lien Statute provides for an automatic lien and makes notice
optional. Christensen's argument, however, would render a large portion of the statute
meaningless, and courts are to "interpret statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid
rendering portions of the statute superfluous." See LKL Assocs. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, iJ
7 and Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2012 UT 91,

iJ 11.

What the

Statute actually states is that an attorney has a right, but not an obligation, to record an
attorney's lien. But once the attorney elects to record an attorney's lien, then the attorney
must provide proper notice of the lien to the property owner, and that the notice "shall"
include, among other things:
[A] verification that the property is the subject of or connected with work
performed by the attorney for the client and that a demand for payment of
amounts owed to the attorney for the work has been made and not been paid
within 30 days of the demand.
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UTAH

CODE ANN.§ 38-2-7(5)(c) (emphasis supplied).
Christensen then argues that even if he violated a statutory notice requirement, his

failure to comply with the stahltory requirements of the Attorney's Lien Statute does not
invalidate the Lien. That argument would again render the provisions of the Attorney's
Lien Statute superfluous, which is contrary to Utah law. LKL Assocs. v. Farley, 2004 UT
51, 17. Christensen's argument also contradicts Utah's firmly established requirement that
lienors must strictly comply with the stahltory lien requirements. See, e.g., First Sec. Mtg.
Co., 631 P.2d at 921-22.

Christensen cites State v. Moreno for the proposition that courts should construe
statutes in the same title in harmony with each other. 2009 UT 15, ,r I 0. Christensen then
goes on to argue that there are two notice provisions within Title 38, one applying to lien
notices generally and the other specifically to attorney's liens. Christensen then argues that
because a failure to meet the general notice requirements does not invalidate a lien, a failure
to meet the notice requirements of the Attorney's Lien Statute should likewise not be fatal
to a lien. Christensen's argument is flawed in several respects.
First, Moreno suggests that the provisions within the same chapter should be read
harmoniously, and not provisions within the same title as Christensen argues. See Moreno,
2009 UT 15 at ,J 10. A title in the Utah Code contains numerous legislative acts, and those
acts do not necessarily relate to one another. Second, if the general notice provision in
Title 38 were functionally identical to the notice provisions in the Attorney's Lien Statute,
the latter would be superfluous, and that is a disfavored result. LKL Assocs. v. Farley, 2004
UT 51, ,J 7. Third, the general notice requirement expressly states that it does not apply to
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"any other liens subject to the same or stricter notice requirements than those imposed [by
this section.]" UTAH CODE ANN.§ 38-12-102(3)(k). For all of these reasons, Clu-istensen's
application of Moreno is invalid.

vii.

Christensen's False Statements are More than Irregularities.

Christensen argues that his misrepresentations in the Lien are mere "irregularities"
that do not render the Lien unenforceable. Christensen's statements, however, are far more
than mere "irregularities." In the Lien, Christensen misrepresented: (a) the basis for the
Lien; (b) how and when Rehn obtained the Property; (c) the amount of the Lien; (d) the
statute purportedly authorizing the Lien; (e) the legal representation leading to the Lien;
and (f) who Rehn had actually hired. Had Christensen made accurate statements in the
Lien, he would not have been able to give the Lien the facial appearance of a properly
lodged attorney's lien that related back years and the encumbered property awarded to a
client through the attorney's effort.

C.

Christensen Did Not Possess A Consensual Lien.

i.

Christensen Judicially Admitted there was No Consensual Lien
and Subsequently Confirmed that Judicial Admission.

Christensen argues that the trial court construed Christensen's admission too
broadly as referring to all of the Appellees. Christensen's Answer to Paragraph 114 states:
"Defendants admit that there was no signed agreement authorizing the filing of the lien but
deny any other allegations of fact in this paragraph." R. 324. Christensen defined the term
"Defendants" as including Mr. Christensen, SSC, CCP, and HC. R. 313. It would
contradict Christensen's plainly stated definition to read the term "Defendants" as only
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applying to SSC and Mr. Christensen. Thus, the trial court construed Christensen's judicial
admission exactly as Christensen wrote it, and Christensen affinnatively admitted that none
of the Defendants possessed a contractual lien right.

Mr. Christensen and the other Defendants/Appellees are all experienced litigators.
They knew all too well that, '" an admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission
and is normally conclusive on the party making it."' Lawrence v. Intermountain, Inc., 201 O
UT App 313, if 13 n.5 (quoting Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d413, 415 (Utah 1984)).

~

The fact that Christensen confirmed the judicial admission by withdrawing his Motion to
Amend the judicial admission demonstrates that the Judicial Admission was no accident.
Christensen stated in that Withdrawal that "Counsel has reviewed the matter and has
determined that an amendment is not needed." R. 1949. The trial court then made a
specific finding that "the Defendants have judicially admitted that there was no contractual

~i

right to record a lien." R. 1957. This Court should confirm the trial court's finding that
Cbristensenjudicially admitted that there was no contractual, and thus no consensual, right
to a lien.
Christensen argues that admissions in an Answer should only extend to the language
asserted in the Complaint, but Christensen cites no authority whatsoever for this
proposition.

Moreover, in this case that would contradict the plain language of

Christensen's Answer in which he specifically defined "Defendants" and then stated that
the "Defendants" had no contractual right to a lien. Christensen quotes the 90-year-old
Geros v. Harries, 236 P. 220 (Utah 1925) case, but Geros states that the Complaint should
be considered as a whole. Id. at 222. Admissions and Denials stated in an Answer are not
34
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<t,

subject to the same "na1Tative" interpretation because admissions and denials do not create
a naITative account.
ii.

Christensen's Judicial Admission is
Engagement Letter and the Lien.

Consistent with the

Christensen's judicial admission that no contractual right to a lien existed is further
bolstered by the Engagement Letter he drafted for Mr. Rehn to execute. In the Engagement
Letter, _Christensen stated that his right to an attorney's lien was "as permitted by the laws
of the State of Utah." R. 1134. This kind of provision in a representation agreement is
what attorneys use to reference Utah's Attorney's Lien Statute. R. 3941 at 78:9-23. The
Engagement Letter does not create a separate lien right; rather, it alerts the client to the
attorney's right to lien under Utah's Attorney Lien Statute.
The Lien itself demonstrates that Christensen construed his Engagement Letter as
only referencing the attorney's statutory lien right. That is why he drafted the Lien to appear
to be an attorney's lien under Utah's Attorney's Lien Statute rather than a consensual lien.
R. 1063. Instead of referencing a contractual right to lien, the Lien itself plainly states,

[Tlhe undersigned holds and claims a lien by virtue of the provision of
Section 78-51-41, Utah Code Ann., 1953, which entitles the undersigned
to the lien described above.
R. 1063 (emphasis supplied). When he was deposed, Mr. Christensen admitted that when
he drafted the Lien, it was not based on a contract but rather on Utah's Attorney Lien
Statute. R. 3944 at 199:23-200:23. Given the fact that Christensen's JudicJal Admission
is consistent with his deposition testimony and the declaration in the Lien itself, it is
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untenable for Christen to suggest that his judicial admission was misinterpreted by the Trial
Comi.

D.

The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Ruling Does Not Constitute
Harmful Error because Rehn Established at Trial that the Lien was
False, and that the Lien Disparaged Rehn 's Title.

Christensen argues that the trial court's summary judgment rnling was harmful
error, but the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that,

'An error is harmful if, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, [if] our
confidence in the verdict ... is undermined.'

State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 115 (quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,137).
In this case, a jury found that Christensen acted with malice. Christensen admitted
under cross-examination at trial that the Lien contained many "errors" and that Mr.
Christensen knew of these "errors." See, e.g., R. 3944 at 187:21- 189:9; 190:13- 192:18;
193:8-194:11; 194:18-195:23; 196:9-197:7, See also Christensen's Brief at 14.

Mr.

Christensen also testified at trial that he was aware that the Lien was interfering with Rehn
selling the Property. R. 3944 at 208:6-21. Thus, even if the trial court had not previously
determined on summary judgment that the false statements and disparagement had been
established, Rehn established those elements at trial.

The evidence of falsity, and

knowledge of the falsity was sufficient to convince the jury to find him guilty of acting
with malice. There was no harmful error.
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IV.

REHN AMPLY ESTABLISHED MALICE AT TRIAL.
Christensen argues that Rehn failed to prove that Mr. Clu·istensen knew the Lien

was false and unenforceable, and that Rehn then failed to prove that Cluistensen acted with
malice. Under Utah law,
Malice 'may be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully publishes
something untrue or spwious under circumstances that it should reasonably
foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property.'

Dillon v. S. Mgmt, Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, if 36 (quoting First Sec. Bank v.
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989)). Christensen has conceded that
Rehn established at trial that the Lien contained false statements and that Mr. Christensen
knew of these false statements. Christensen's Brief at 14.
What Christensen argued in his directed verdict motion was that Rehn failed to
prove that Christensen actually knew that it was an ''unenforceable false lien." R. 3944 at
123: 17-124:5. But the trial record is chock full of evidence that Christensen knew the Lien
was unenforceable. That evidence included: i) Christensen's falsification of virtually every
aspect of the Lien to make it appear like an amendment to an earlier recorded attorney's
line that never existed See, e.g., id at 187:21-197:7; ii) Christensen's decision to withhold
notice of the Lien from Rehn Id at 173:8-175:18, 177:4-13; 261:25-262: 3; iii)
Christensen's subsequent drafting of a letter dissembling about the purpose of the Lien. Id
at 179:3-15; 182:4-22. These facts, combined with the fact that Christensen was an
attorney at the time, provide more than sufficient evidence to imply to a jury that
Christensen lmew the Lien was unenforceable when Christensen recorded it. The fact that
the Lien states the Property was awarded to Rehn in the divorce action, R. 1063, is itself
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sufficient to supp01i a jury finding of malice. No one would know better than Christensen
(as Rehn's divorce attorney) that his statement is a bold faced lie. R 3944 at 192:10-18.
Christensen,s reliance upon Dillon v. S. Mgmt., Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT
14 is misplaced. In Dillon, the Utah Supreme Comi merely restated prior opinions when
it addressed slander of title, such as those found in First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing,
780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). See id. at if 36. Moreover, in Dillon, the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that a slander of title did occur because the evidence demonstrated implied
malice and actual knowledge. See id. at

iJiJ

38-40. Thus, Dillon actually favors the

Plaintiffs by demonstrating the various ways malice may be proven.
Christensen's reliance upon First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253
(Utah 1989) is likewise misplaced. Although the Utah Supreme Court did not conclude
malice existed, it gave an even broader definition of malice:
Malice may be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully records or
publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or misleading
impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that it should
reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property.

Id. at 1257 (emphasis supplied).
In Banberry, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the inaccuracies were
inadvertent and subsequently corrected when discovered. See id. In contrast, Christensen
refused to release any portion of the Lien when he was notified it was false. R. 3944 at
209:8-210: 17 11 at

iJ 84 and R.

321 at

if 84.

Instead, he started demanding even more

money to release the Lien.
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Given these facts and the highly deferential standard of review, Christensen cannot
overcome his substantial burden. State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9,

,r 32.

The Comt

should affinn the jury's finding that Clu·istensen acted with malice.

V.

CHRISTENSEN PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE REGARDING
REASONABLENESS OF REHN'S ATTORNEY FEES.

THE

Christensen argues that Rehn' s fees are um·easonable, but Christensen never
provided any evidence regarding the unreasonableness ofRehn's attorney fees. Indeed, it
is ironic that Mr. Christensen is arguing about the reasonableness of atto1ney fees, when
the Utah Supreme Comt has previously chastised Mr. Christensen for seeking over $2.1
Million in patently unreasonable attmney fees, and refen-ed Mr. Christensen to the Office
of Professional Conduct for violating several ethical duties in seeking to obtain
unreasonable fees. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, il1 175-211.
At trial, the jury was directed to detennine ifRehn's attorney fees were reasonably
necessary. R. 3866. Christensen did not object to this instruction. Id.

During the

evidentiary portion of trial, the jury reviewed Rehn's actual billing records and detailed
billing entries. Id. Rehn solicited detailed testimony from one of his attorneys, Jared C.
Bowman, regarding the reasonableness of these fees. Id. Christensen cross-examined that
attorney. Christensen then failed to present any other evidence suggesting that the fees
were unreasonable. Id. Christensen did not call an attorney as an expert or have Mr.
Christensen opine on the reasonableness of Rehn' s fees.

See id. Instead, Christensen

relied entirely on argument and a "vigorous cross-examination" of Mr. Relm's attorney.

Id.

The jury heard Christensen's arguments and the jury heard Christensen's cross-
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examination. R. 3866-3867. The jury also had all ofRehn's billing entries to pour over in
the jury room during deliberation. R. 3867. Because the only evidence provided at trial
supported the reasonableness ofRehn's att01ney fees, and no evidence suppo11ed a contrary
finding, substantial evidence precluded the trial comt from granting Christensen's Motion
for a JNOV. Id.
On Appeal, Christensen once again attempts to overturn the jury's verdict without
any evidence. Where all of the evidence supports the jury's verdict, and no evidence
refutes it, Christensen cannot show that there is "no basis in the evidence, including
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination."
ASC Utah, Inc. v. WolfMountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT 24, ,r 18. Accordingly, the jury's

verdict must be affirmed.
VI.

CONCLUSION.

This case is but the latest in what is becoming a long line of appellate decisions
dealing with attorney Steve Christensen's misuse of his attorney lien power against his own
clients. What is so alarming about Christensen's conduct in the present case is the extent
to which Christensen set out to manufacture and record a patently fraudulent lien and then
lie about the purpose of the lien when he got caught. He then refused to release the Lien
unless Mr. Rehn paid an exorbitant release. price. When Mr. Rehn refused to be extorted,
Christensen tried to exhaust Mr. Rehn in litigation. There can be no more reprehensible
conduct by an attorney than this kind of deceit and abuse of power, and the growing body
of appellate decisions documenting Christensen's abuse ofhis attorney lien power suggests
that there is something fundamentally wrong with Christensen. For all of the foregoing
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reasons, this Court should reverse: (1) the trial comi's denial of an award of attorney fees
to Rehn; (2) order the trial court to award Rehn his attorney fees incun-ed in prevailing
against Christensen's attempt to enforce the Engagement Letter's right to lien provision;
and (3) direct the trial com1 to award Rehn his attorney fees incun-ed in this appeal. With
regard to Clnistensen's Cross-Appeal, the Court should: (a) affinn the trial court's
summary judgment ruling that the first two elements of Rehn' s slander of title claim were
established; (b) affirm the trial court's denial of Christensen's Motion for a Directed
Verdict; (c) affirm the trial court's denial of Christensen's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Rehn respectfully requests oral argument on this appeal.
-DATED this 9th day of March, 2016.
WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C.

Josczg~na

Jared C. Bowman
Attorneys for Appellants
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